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Abstract: We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies
and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable
matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as
matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as
the median stable matching.
Keywords: aggregate matching; median stable matching; rationalizability; lattice
1. Introduction
Following the seminal work of [1], an extensive literature has developed regarding
matching markets with non-transferable utility. This literature assumes that there are
agent-specific preferences, and studies the existence of stable matchings in which each
agent prefers her assigned partner to the outside option of being unmatched, and there
are no pairs of agents that would like to match with each other rather than keeping their
assigned partners.
In this paper, we develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings, which we
interpret as a dataset of matchings, and consider its testable implications. In an aggregate
matching, agents are classified into types according to their observable characteristics:
for example age, employment status, gender, or race. The aggregate matching is then a
table, a matrix, that records how many women of each type are matched with men of each
type. Our notion of matching data is more general than just deterministic matchings and
includes randomized matchings of agents to objects (a probabilistic assignment of children
to schools, for example, as in [2,3]) as well. Therefore, our results are also applicable to
randomized matching environments.
We assume that preferences are at the type-specific level, rather than the individual-
level. In our setting, accommodating individual-level preferences would entail losing all
empirical bite. Thus we adopt instead the assumption that the definition of types already
carries all the information needed to determine agents’ preferences. This differs from the
approach in empirical applications of matching theory, which assume transferable utilities
(see, e.g., [4] or [5]), but allow for heterogeneous preferences at the individual-level. When
our results are taken to data, one needs to introduce an appropriate error structure that
allows for individual-level randomness but without individual-level preference heterogene-
ity. One way of doing this is via measurement error, as in the classical revealed preference
theory for consumption [6,7]. One illustration can be found in [8].
We establish fundamental results on the set of stable matchings in Theorem 1. First of
all, there exists a stable matching. Then we introduce two partial orders on matchings using
preferences of the two sides of the market and show that for every set of stable matchings
there exists the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound with respect to the two
partial orders in the set of stable matchings, i.e., the set of stable matchings endowed with
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either partial order is a complete lattice. Furthermore, we show an additional structural
result that this lattice is distributive. (The definition of distributive lattices is given in
Section 2). Using the lattice structure on the set of stable matchings, we show that there
exists a median stable matching, which assigns each agent the median outcome among
all stable matching outcomes (Corollary 1). Theorem 1 also provides other structural
results including “polarity of interests”, saying that a stable matching is more preferred
for men if and only if it is less preferred for women. Furthermore, the outcomes in two
stable matchings are always comparable using the partial orders for an agent. The “rural
hospitals theorem”, which states that for each type of agent the number of partners in any
two stable matchings are the same, also holds.
Once the stability of matchings is understood, we turn to the main question in the
paper: when we interpret an aggregate matching as a table of matching data, and when we
do not have access to the agents’ preferences, when can we say that the data is consistent
with the theory? This is a revealed preference question that has been addressed by [9]
(see also [10,11]). Here we focus on a particular selection of stable matchings—the median
stable matching, which is defined for markets with deterministic outcomes. We provide a
sufficient condition under which matching is rationalizable as the median stable matching
(Theorem 3). We show that the condition is not necessary in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 on the structure of stable matchings generalizes well-known results in
the literature to allow for randomization, aggregate matchings, and continuum of agents
(see [12] for a review). Proposition 1 establishes the existence of generalized median stable
matchings in our environment. For earlier existence results of median stable matchings
see [13–18]. Revealed preference studies include [9,11,19,20]. The works of [9,20] take




If S is a set and ≤ is a partial order on S, we say that the pair (S,≤) is a partially
ordered set . We say that x, y ∈ S are comparable if x ≤ y or y ≤ x. A partially ordered set
(S,≤) is a lattice if, for every x, y ∈ S, the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound
of x, y with respect to the partial order ≤ exist in S. We denote the least upper bound of
x, y by x ∨ y; and the greatest lower bound of x, y by x ∧ y. Similarly, if for every S′ ⊂ S,
the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of S′ exist in S, the lattice (S,≤) is
called complete.
We say that a lattice (S,≤) is distributive if the following holds for all x, y, z ∈ S:
• x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z), and
• x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z).
2.2. Graph Theory
An (undirected) graph is a pair G = (V, L), where V is a set and L is a subset of V×V.
A path in G is a sequence p = 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 such that for n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, (vn, vn+1) ∈ L.
We write v ∈ p to denote that v is a vertex in p. A path 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 connects the vertices
v0 and vN . A path 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 is minimal if there is no proper subsequence of 〈v0, . . . , vN〉
which is also a path connecting the vertices v0 and vN . The length of path 〈v0, . . . , vN〉
is N.
A cycle in G is a path c = 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 with v0 = vN . A cycle is minimal if for any
two vertices vn and vn′ in c, the paths in c from vn to vn′ and from vn′ to vn are distinct
and minimal. We call v and w adjacent in c if there is n such that vn = v and vn+1 = w or
vn = w and vn+1 = v. If c and c′ are two cycles, and there is a path from a vertex of c to a
vertex of c′, then we say that c and c′ are connected.
3. Model
The primitives of the model are represented by a four-tuple 〈M, W, P, K〉, where
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• M and W are finite and disjoints sets of, respectively types of men, and types of
women.
• P is a preference profile: a list of preferences Pm for every type-m man and Pw for
every type-w woman. Each Pm is a linear order over W ∪ w0, and each Pw is a linear
order over M ∪m0. Here, w0 and m0 represent the outside option of being unmatched.
The weak order associated with Pm is denoted by Rm and the weak order associated
with Pw is denoted by Rm.
• K is a list of non-negative real numbers Km for each m ∈ M and Kw for each w ∈ W.
There are Km type-m men and Kw type-w women.
We enumerate M as m1, . . . , m|M| and W as w1, . . . , w|W|. A matching is a |M| × |W|
matrix X = (xmi ,wj) such that xmi ,wj ∈ <+, ∑j xmi ,wj ≤ Kmi for all i, and ∑i xmi ,wj ≤ Kwj for
all j. (<+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.) We denote the mass of single
m-agents in X by xm,w0 , and denote the mass of single w-agents in X by xm0,w.
The ith row of a matching X is denoted by Xmi ,·, and the j
th column by X·,wj . When it
is not ambiguous, we write Xmi , or Xi, for Xmi ,·, and Xwj , or Xj, for X·,wj . Similarly, we use
xi,j for xmi ,wj .
Our solution concept is stability:
Definition 1. A matching X is individually rational if xm,w > 0 implies that wPmw0 and
mPwm0.
A pair (m, w) is a blocking pair for X if there exist m′ ∈ M ∪ {m0} and w′ ∈ W ∪ {w0}
such that mPwm′, wPmw′, xm,w′ > 0, and xm′ ,w > 0.
A matching X is stable if it is individually rational and there are no blocking pairs for X.
We denote by S(M, W, P, K) the set of all stable matchings in 〈M, W, P, K〉.
Individual rationality states that if xm,w > 0, then for type-m men type-w women
are more preferred than being unmatched and for type-w women type-m men are more
preferred than being unmatched. A pair (m, w) is a blocking pair if type-m men have
a positive measure of partners who are less preferred than type-w women and type-w
women have a positive measure of partners who are less preferred than type-m men.
Two special cases of our model are worth emphasizing: The model of random match-
ing is obtained when Km = 1 for all m, and each Kw is a natural number. The interpretation
of random matching is that men are “students” and women are “schools”. Students are
assigned to schools at random, and each school w has Kw seats available for students.
In real-life school choice, the randomization often results from indifferences in schools’
preferences over students [3]: Matching theory often requires strict preferences, so a ran-
dom “priority order” is produced for the schools in order to break indifferences. Random
matchings arise in many other situations as well, because random assignment is often a
basic consequence of fairness considerations (if two children want the same toy, fairness
demands that they flip a coin to determine who gets it).
The second model is that of integral complete matching, where all Km and Kw are
natural numbers, and all entries of a matching X are natural numbers. The interpretation
is that there are Km type-m men and Kw type-w women, and that a matching X exhibits
in xm,w how many type m men matched to type-w women. This special case captures
actual observations in marriage models (see, for example, [8]). We observe that men and
women are partitioned into types according to their observable characteristics (age, income,
education, etc.); and we are given a table showing how many type-m men married type-w
women. These observations are essentially “flow” observations (marriages in a given year),
so the integral complete matchings do not have any single agents.
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4. Structure of Stable Matchings
In this section, we study the structure of stable matchings. For each m ∈ M, define
χm = x ∈ <|W|+ : ∑
1≤j≤|W|
xj ≤ Km,
and a partial order ≤m on χm by





where x0 = Km −∑1≤j≤|W| xj, and y0 = Kw −∑1≤j≤|W| yj.
Note that ≤m is defined by analogy with the first-order stochastic dominance order
on probability distributions. In the case where Km = 1, vectors x and y in χm represent
probability distributions over the types of women that m may match to. In that case y ≤m x
if and only if the lottery induced by y over W ∪ {w0} is worse than the lottery induced by
x, for any von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that is compatible with Rm.
Letting χw = x ∈ <|M|+ : ∑1≤i≤|M| xi ≤ Kw, we define ≤w in an analogous way.
We introduce two partial orders on matchings. Suppose X and Y are matchings, then:
• X ≤M Y if, for all m ∈ M, Xm ≤m Ym
• X ≤W Y if, for all w ∈W, Xw ≤w Yw.
Theorem 1. (S(M, W, P, K),≤M) and (S(M, W, P, K),≤W) are nonempty, complete, and dis-
tributive lattices; in addition, for X, Y ∈ S(M, W, P, K)
1. X ≤M Y if and only if Y ≤W X;
2. for all a ∈ M ∪W, either Xa ≤a Ya or Ya ≤a Xa;
3. for all m, ∑w∈W xm,w = ∑w∈Wym,w and for all w, ∑m∈Mxm,w = ∑m∈Mym,w.
Theorem 1 presents a version, adapted to our model, of the standard results on
matching theory. The proof is in Appendix B. Statement (1) is a “polarity of interests”
result, saying that a stable matching X is better for men if and only if it is worse for women.
Statement (2) says that the outcomes in two stable matchings are always comparable for
an agent: note that ≤a is an incomplete preference relation. Statement (3) is the “rural
hospitals theorem,” which says that the same number of agents of a given type are matched
in any two stable matchings.
Theorem 1 also implies that there are two stable matchings, XM and XW , such that for
all stable matchings X,
XW ≤M X ≤M XM, and
XM ≤W X ≤W XW .
We refer to XM as the man-optimal (M-optimal) stable matching, and to XW as the
woman-optimal (W-optimal) stable matching. We also call XM and XW extremal stable
matchings. A matching X is the unique stable matching if S(M, W, P, K) = X; in this case
X coincides with the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable matchings.
Perhaps extremal stable matchings are unlikely to arise because they favor one side
of the market over the other. One may instead be interested in matchings that present a
compromise. The median stable matching provides such a compromise by assigning each
agent a partner who is median ranked amongst all of his/her stable matching partners.
Indeed in an experimental study on decentralized market, ref. [21] find that the median
stable matching tends to emerge among stable matchings. As such, we may want to test
whether an observed matching in field data is rationalizable as a median stable matching.
It is not obvious that median stable matchings exist. We shall first show that median
stable matchings exist by only considering integral matchings that have integer entries,
and then present a sufficient condition for rationalizability as a median stable matching.
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We consider a market 〈M, W, P, K〉, where all numbers Km, Kw, and entries of match-
ings X are non-negative integers. Consequently, the number of stable matchings is finite,
say n. Let S(M, W, P, K) = {X1, . . . , Xn} be the set of stable matchings. For each agent
a we consider all stable outcomes and rank them according to ≥a. All the outcomes are
comparable by (2) of Theorem 1. More formally, let {X(1)a , . . . , X(n)a } = {X1a , . . . , Xna } and
X(1)a ≥a . . . ≥a X(n)a . Using these ranked outcomes and (1) of Theorem 1, we construct







Y(l) assigns each type of men the lth best outcome, and each type of women the lth worst
outcome among stable matching partners.
Proposition 1. Y(l) is a stable matching.
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the lattice structure of the set of stable match-
ings. It is essentially the same as the proofs of Theorem 3.2 in [22] and Theorem 1 of [17].
If n is odd we term Y(
n+1





2 +1)) as the median stable matching (of course the choice is arbitrary).
Corollary 1. The median stable matching exists.
5. Testable Implications
Suppose that we are given a data of a matching X, and the corresponding M, W and
K. Similar to [9], we assume that there are no “singles,” or unmatched agents, and so
∑m Km = ∑w Kw, and ∑w xm,w = Km for all m, and ∑m xm,w = Kw for all w. We call such
a matching in which there are no singles complete. We ask when there are preferences
for the different types of men and women such that X is a stable matching or an extremal
stable matching (which is shown to exist in Section 4).
Definition 2. A matching X is rationalizable if there exists a preference profile
P = ((Pm)m∈M, (Pw)w∈W) such that X is a stable matching in 〈M, W, P, K〉. A matching
X is M-optimal (W-optimal) rationalizable if there is a preference profile P such that X is the
M-optimal (W-optimal) stable matching in 〈M, W, P, K〉.
We also want to know when a matching can be rationalized as the median stable matching.
Definition 3. An integral matching X is median-rationalizable if there is a preference profile P
such that X is the median stable matching in 〈M, W, P, K〉.
To answer the questions, we define a graph (V, L), where V consists of all the positive
entries in X, and there is an edge (v, v′) ∈ L if and only if v and v′ are either in the same row
or in the same column in X. More formally, for each matching X we associate a graph (V, L)
defined as follows. The set of vertices V is {(m, w) : m ∈ M, w ∈ W such that xm,w > 0},
and an edge ((m, w), (m′, w′)) ∈ L is formed for every pair of vertices (m, w) and (m′, w′)
with m = m′ or w = w′.
A previous study finds that the rationalizability of a matching depends on minimal
cycles (defined in Section 2.2) of its associated graph: (The result in [9] is more general than
what is stated here.)
Theorem 2 ([9]).
1. A complete matching X is rationalizable if and only if its associated graph does not contain
two connected, distinct, minimal cycles.
2. A complete matching X is M-optimal (W-optimal) rationalizable if and only if its associated
graph has no minimal cycle.
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For example, let matching X be the matrix on the left, with three types of men and
women. Its associated graph is depicted on the right:
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Theorem 2 (Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013b)). (1) A complete matching X
is rationalizable if and only if its associated graph does not contain two connected,
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are connected; thus the matching is not rationalizable.
The rationalizability by stable matchings and extremal stable matchings only depends on
whether each number xm,w is positive or 0. However, we find that median rationalizability
depends on the value of xm,w as well as whether xm,w is positive or zero.
If 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 is a minimal cycle, then N is an even number. We say that a minimal cycle
c is balanced if
min {v0, v2, . . . , vN−2} = min {v1, v3, . . . , vN−1} .4
Theorem 3. An integral complete matching X is median rationalizable if it is rationalizable
and if all minimal cycles of (V, L) are balanced.
The proof is in Appendix B. It is worth observing that, in our proof, we construct
preferences such that the resulting number of stable matchings is odd. Therefore, our results
do not depend on the choice of Y (
n
2
) or Y (
n
2
+1) as the median stable matching when n is
even.
















A B C D E
To provide some intuition for this result, consider the following example:
• M = {m1,m2},
• W = {w1, w2},
• km1 = 6, km2 = 5, kw1 = 4, kw2 = 7,
• w2 Pm1 w1, w1 Pm2 w2, m1 Pw1 m2, and m2 Pw2 m1,
where each man prefers all women to being unmatched and each woman prefers all men to
being unmatched. In this market, there are five stable matchings as shown in Figure 1. Note
that the preferences of each type of agent is shown by an arrow, for example the arrow in the
first row represents the preference ranking of m1 that type-w2 woman is more preferred to
type-w1 woman. Therefore, the preferences are “clockwise” cyclical. These matchings differ
4See the example below for an illustration of this condition.
are connected; t us the matching is no ratio alizable.
The rationalizability by stable matchings and extremal stable matchings only depends
on whether each number xm,w is positive or 0. However, we find that median rationaliz-
ability depends on the value of xm,w as well as whether xm,w is positive or zero.
If 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 is a mini al cycle, then N s an even number. We say that a minimal
cycle c is balanced if
min {v0, v2, . . . , vN−2} = min {v1, v3, . . . , vN−1}.
(See the example below for an illustration of this co dition.)
Theorem 3. An integral complete matching X is median-rationalizable if it is rationalizable and if
all minimal cycles of (V, L) are balanced.
The proof is in Appendix C. It is worth observing that, in our proof, we construct
preferences such that the resulting number of stable matchings is odd. Therefore, our
results do not depend on the choice of Y(
n
2 ) or Y(
n
2 +1) as the median stable matching when
n is even.
To provide some intuition for this result, consider the following example:
• M = {m1, m2},
• W = {w1, w2},
• km1 = 6, km2 = 5, kw1 = 4, kw2 = 7,
• w2Pm1w1, w1Pm2w2, m1Pw1m2, and m2Pw2m1,
where each man prefers all women to being unmatched and each woman prefers all men
to being unmatched. In this market, there are five stable matchings as shown in Figure 1.
Note that the preferences of each type of agent is shown by an arrow, for example the
arrow in the first row represents the preference ranking of m1 that type-w2 woman is more
preferred to type-w1 woman. Therefore, the preferences are “clockwise” cyclical. These
matchings differ from each other in that, starting with matching A, matchings B-E are
formed by clockwise “rotations”—that is, by dissolving two couples {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}
and repairing them as {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}. Given the clockwise preferences, moving from
matching A to E, the matchings become increasingly preferred by the men, and at the same
time, less preferred by the women.
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To provide some intuition for this result, consider the following example:
• M = {m1,m2},
• W = {w1, w2},
• km1 = 6, km2 = 5, kw1 = 4, kw2 = 7,
• w2 Pm1 w1, w1 Pm2 w2, m1 Pw1 m2, and m2 Pw2 m1,
where each man prefers all women to being unmatched and each woman prefers all men to
being unmatched. In this market, there are five stable matchings as shown in Figure 1. Note
that the preferences of each type of agent is shown by an arrow, for example the arrow in the
first row represents the preference ranking of m1 that type-w2 woman is more preferred to
type-w1 woman. Therefore, the preferences are “clockwise” cyclical. These matchings differ
4See the example below for an illustration of this condition.
Figure 1. Five stable matchings (matching C is median-stable).
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Hence, matching C is the median stable matching, as the two stable matchings ob-
tained by rotating this matching counterclockwise (i.e., A and B) are more preferred by
the women, while the two obtained by rotating clockwise (i.e., D and E) are more pre-
ferred by the men. (In addition, one cannot rotate further clockwise beyond E, nor further
counterclockwise beyond A, as one “runs out” of pairs in both cases.) Note also that only
in the third matching is the cycle balanced: In the minimal cycle there are four vertices
with entries 2, 4, 3, 2 and when we take the minimum of the entries of the odd-numbered
vertices and the minimum of the entries of the even-numbered vertices for any numbering
of vertices preserving the order in which they appear in the cycle we get:
min{2, 3} = 2 = min{4, 2}.
Therefore, the minimal cycle for matching C is balanced. The balancedness condition
ensures that one can rotate an equal number of times both in the clockwise direction and in
the counterclockwise direction. Furthermore, note that the balancedness condition fails for
the other matchings. For example, in matching B, min{3, 4} = 3 6= 1 = min{3, 1}, there
the minimal cycle in matching B is not balanced.
Note that the stability and rationalizability of a matching only depend on which
entries are zero or positive. Thus if an observed matching X is canonicalized into XC
(xcm,w = 0 if xm,w = 0, and xcm,w = 1 if xm,w > 0), then obviously X is rationalizable if and
only if XC is rationalizable. Given the role of canonical matchings in rationalizability, the
following corollary is of some interest.
Corollary 2. A canonicalized matching XC is either not rationalizable or it is median-rationalizable.
Unfortunately, Theorem 3 provides only a sufficient condition for median-rationalizability.
Corollary 2 gives a characterization of necessary conditions, but only for the case of canon-
ical matchings. To sketch the boundaries of this result, we present two examples in
Appendix A. Example A.1 shows that there are indeed matchings that are not rationalizable
as median stable matchings, so Corollary 2 on canonical matchings does not extend to all
aggregate matchings. Example A.2 shows that the sufficient condition in Theorem 3 is
not necessary.
Author Contributions: All authors have equally contributed to all parts of the paper. All authors
have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
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Appendix A. Examples
Appendix A.1. Matchings Rationalizable, but Not Median-Rationalizable
A rationalizable aggregate matching that cannot be rationalized as a median stable
matching:
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To prove the fact, we reason by induction. We have already established that wj2 Pmi1 wj1 .
Suppose that wjnPmin wjn−1 . By Prop rty 1 of the sequenc 〈(in, jn)〉Nn=1, eith r xin−1,jn−1 > 0
and xin+1,jn+1 > 0; or yin−1,jn−1 > 0 and yin+1,jn+1 > 0 (or both hold). Then the stability of X
and Y implies that min+1 Pwjn min . The proof for the case when win Pwin min−1 is similar. 
The claim implies that the sequence 〈vn〉 = 〈xin,jn〉 is a cycle in (V, L). Thus a stable
matching Y can only differ from X in v tex s that ar part of a cycle f (V, L).
Second, we prove that E ≡ Y −X ∈ E . We established above that ei,j 6= 0 only if xi,j is
a vertex in a ycle. We now prove that |ei,j| ≤ Θ. Clearly, ei,j ≥ −xi,j ≥ −Θ. We show that
if ei,j > 0 then there is h such that ei,j + ei,h = 0.
If ei,j > −ei,h for all h 6= i then there is h1 and h2 such that some type-mi men of type mi
who are married to women of type h1 and h2 in X are married to women of type wj in Y .
Then we can defi e two c cles, and xi,j wou d be a vertex in b th of them. The first cycle has
(xi,j, xi,h1) as the first edge, and the remaining edges defined inductively, by the definition
of 〈(in, jn)〉 above. The second cycle has (xi,j, xi,h2) as the first edge, and the remaining
edges defined inductively. The resulting t o cycles would be connected, which contradicts
the hypothesis that X is rationalizable. So there must exist some h with ei,j ≤ −ei,h. An
analogous argument applied to ei,h impli s that ei,j ≥ −ei,h; so ei,j = −ei,h. Then, ei,j ≤ Θ,
as ei,h ≥ −Θ.
Appendix C. Examples
C.1. There ar matchings ra ionalizable, but no median-rationalizable. A ratio-
nalizable aggregate matching that cannot be rationalized as a median stable matching:
1 3
3 1
The only way to rationalize this aggregate matching is to have a cycled preference profile,
i.e., if w1 Pm1 w2 then m2 Pw1 m1, w2 Pm2 w1, and m1 Pw2 m2. Similarly, if w2 Pm1 w1 then the
preferences of agents are cycled in the opposite direction. Regardless of the choice, all the
feasible aggregate matchings are stable, so there are 5 stable aggregate matchings in total.
Therefore, the median aggregate stable matching is the one where each agent is matched to
both possible partners twice, which is
2 2
2 2
The only way to rat on lize this aggrega e match ng is to have cycled preference
profile, i.e., if w1Pm1w2 then m2Pw1m1, w2Pm2w1, and m1Pw2m2. Similarly, if w2Pm1w1
then the preferences of agents are cycled in the opposite direction. Regardless of the choice,
all the feasible aggregate matchings are stable, so there are 5 stable aggr gate matchings
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The claim implies that the sequence 〈vn〉 = 〈xin,jn〉 is a cycle in (V, L). Thus a stable
matching Y can only differ from X in vertexes that are part of a cycle of (V, L).
Second, we prove that E ≡ Y −X ∈ E . We established above that ei,j 6= 0 only if xi,j is
a vertex in a cycle. We now prove that |ei,j| ≤ Θ. Clearly, ei,j ≥ −xi,j ≥ −Θ. We show that
if ei,j > 0 then there is h such that ei,j + ei,h = 0.
If ei,j > −ei,h for all h 6= i then there is h1 and h2 such that some type-mi men of type mi
who are married to women of type h1 and h2 in X are married to women of type wj in Y .
Then we can define two cycles, and xi,j would be a vertex in both of them. The first cycle has
(xi,j, xi,h1) as the first edge, and the remaining edges defined inductively, by the definition
of 〈(in, jn)〉 above. The second cycle has (xi,j, xi,h2) as the first edge, and the remaining
edges defined inductively. The resulting two cycles would be connected, which contradicts
the hypothesis that X is rationalizable. So there must exist some h with ei,j ≤ −ei,h. An
analogous argument applied to ei,h implies that ei,j ≥ −ei,h; so ei,j = −ei,h. Then, ei,j ≤ Θ,
as ei,h ≥ −Θ.
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C.1. There are matchings rationalizable, but not median-rationalizable. A ratio-
nalizable aggregate matching that cannot be rationalized as a median stable matching:
1 3
3 1
The only way to rationalize this aggregate matching is to have a cycled preference profile,
i.e., if w1 Pm1 w2 then m2 Pw1 m1, w2 Pm2 w1, and m1 Pw2 m2. Similarly, if w2 Pm1 w1 then the
preferences of agents are cycled in the opposite direction. Regardless of the choice, all the
feasible aggregate matchings are stable, so there are 5 stable aggregate matchings in total.
Therefore, the median aggregate stable matching is the one where each agent is matched to
both possible partners twice, which is
2 2
2 2
Appendix A.2. Median-Rationalizability Condition Is Not Necessary
The following example shows that the sufficient condition in Theorem 3 is not nec-











We choose the preferences such that the graph corresponding to X is as follows. Note
that we indicate preference with an arrow, so that for example xi,j → xi,h means that
whPmiwj.
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These two matchings are better for the men. In all, then, under the rationalizing pref-
erences as in the arrows, there are 7 stable matchings, and X is the median stable matching.
There is a crucial aspect of the example that makes this possible. Note that, if we
are to rotate the upper part of the graph, we need preferences to be as indicated by
the arrows. In particular, we must have x2,3 → x1,3 for the graph to be rationalizable;
then, to accommodate a > 0 entry in x1,2 after the rotation, we must have x1,3 → x1,2,
or otherwise we would get a blocking pair (m1, w3). However, positive entries in x1,3 and
in x3,2 imply that we need x1,2 → x3,2 (the long dotted arrow in the graph in order to satisfy
that x1,3 → x1,2. Now, a modification of X that has a positive entry in x1,2 is only possible
if we simultaneously set x3,1 = 0, as x3,1 → x3,2 and x1,2 → x3,2. Hence the rotation of the
upper side of the graph is not feasible under any of the modification of X that improve the
matches of the women.
There is, therefore, an asymmetry in the graph that allows us to offset the unbalanced-
ness of the number of men and women in the cycle.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1
We split up the proof in short propositions.
Lemma A1. (χm,≤m) is a complete lattice, with a largest and smallest element.
Proof. That (χm,≤m) is a partially ordered set follows from the definition of ≤m. Take
a subset Sm of χm. We need to show that Sm has the least upper bound and the greatest
lower bound in (χm,≤m) to complete the proof.
For every x ∈ χm, define x0 = Km − ∑1≤j≤|W| xj. By definition, for every x ∈ χm,
∑0≤j≤|W| xj = Km. Assign a new index {(j) : j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , |W|} over W ∪ {w0} such that
w(0)Pmw(1)Pm . . . Pmw(|W|)
Let z(0) = sup{x(0) : x ∈ Sm}. Define z(i) inductively as follows: z(i) = sup{x(0) +
. . . + x(i) : x ∈ Sm} − (z(0) + . . . + z(i−1)).
Note that z(j) ≥ 0 and ∑
0≤j≤|W|
z(j) = Km. We define z as a |W|-vector, (z1, . . . , z|W|),
with respect to the original index. Clearly, zj ≥ 0 and ∑
1≤j≤|W|
zj ≤ Km, so z ∈ χm.





z(j) = sup{x(0) + . . . + x(i) : x ∈ Sm} which is greater than
x(0) + . . . + x(i) for all x ∈ Sm and 0 ≤ i ≤ |W|. Therefore, z ≥m x for all x ∈ Sm, which
means that z is an upper bound.
Suppose that z′ is another upper bound of Sm. Therefore, z′(0) + . . . + z
′
(i) ≥ x(0) +
. . . + x(i) for all x ∈ Sm and 0 ≤ i ≤ |W|. If we take the supremum of the right hand side,
then we get z′(0) + . . . + z
′
(i) ≥ sup{x(0) + . . . + x(i) : x ∈ Sm} for all 0 ≤ i ≤ |W|. On the
other hand, z(0) + . . . + z(i) = sup{x(0) + . . . + x(i) : x ∈ Sm}. The last two impressions
imply z′(0) + . . . + z
′
(i) ≥ z(0) + . . . + z(i) for all i, so z′ ≥m z. Thus, z is the least upper
bound of Sm.
Similarly, we can construct the greatest lower bound of Sm as follows: u(0) = inf{x(0) :
x ∈ Sm}. Define u(i) inductively: u(i) = inf{x(0) + . . . + x(i) : x ∈ Sm} − (u(0) + . . . +
u(i−1)). The proof that u is the greatest lower bound of of Sm is similar to the proof that z is
the least upper bound of Sm, so it is omitted.
For each m, let the choice Cm be defined as follows. For a vector x ∈ <|W|+ , let Cm(x)
be the vector in
y ∈ χm : yj ≤ xj, j = 1, . . . , |W|
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that is maximal for ≤m. In other words, if x represents the quantities of type of women
available for m, Cm chooses according to Pm from the best choice downwards until filling
quota Km. Note that if w0Pmwj then yj = 0, and if ∑j:wjPmw0 yj ≤ Km then y0 = Km −
∑j:wjPmw0 yj. Define Cw analogously.
Proposition A1. (S(M, W, P, K),≤M) is a nonempty and complete lattice.
Proof. A man pre-matching is a matrix A = (am,w)M×W such that am,w ∈ <+ and
∑w am,w ≤ Km. A woman pre-matching is a matrix B = (bm,w)M×W such that bm,w ∈ <+
and ∑m bm,w ≤ Kw.
We consider pairs (A, B), where A is a man prematching, and B is a woman prematch-
ing, ordered by a partial order ≤. The order ≤ is defined as (A, B) ≤ (A′, B′) if
∀m ∈ M, ∀w ∈W, (Am ≤m A′m and B′w ≤w Bw).
The order ≤ is a product order of complete lattices by Lemma A1, so that the set of all
pairs (A, B) ordered by ≤ is a complete lattice.
We define a function C, mapping pairs (A, B) of prematchings into pairs of prematch-
ings. Fix (A, B): For a type-m man, the number of type-w women who are willing to
match with m at B is θm,w = Kw −∑i:mi Pwm bi,w. Let Θ = (θm,w), i.e., the |M| × |W|-matrix
such that entry θm,w is the number of type-w women who are willing to match with type
m men at B. Similarly, let Ψ = (ψm,w) be the |M| × |W|-matrix for which entry ψm,w is
the number of type-m men who are willing to match with type-w women at A. Now
let C(A, B) = (Ã, B̃) where Ãm = Cm(Θm) and B̃w = Cw(Ψw). Note that Ã is a man
prematching and B̃ is a woman prematching.
We now prove that C is isotone. Assuming that (A, B) ≤ (A′, B′), we prove that
C(A, B) ≤ C(A′, B′).






because B′w ≤w Bw. As a consequence, a type-m man has weakly more women of each
type willing to match with him in B′ than in B: i.e., Θm ≤ Θ′m. Thus Cm(Θm) ≤m Cm(Θ′m).
Similarly, for a type w woman, Cw(Ψ′w) ≤w Cw(Ψw). It follows that C(A, B) ≤ C(A′, B′).
By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, there is a fixed point of C, and the set of fixed points of C
is a complete lattice when ordered by ≤.
Let (A, B) be a fixed point of C, i.e., (A, B) = C(A, B). Assume that am,w > bm,w for
some m and w. Cw(Ψw) = Bw and am,w > bm,w implies that although am,w number of
type-m men were available, only bm,w of them are chosen by Cw. Therefore, all nonnegative
entries in Bw are at least as good as m with respect to Rw. This implies that θm,w = bm,w.
Since bm,w < am,w, we get θm,w < am,w which contradicts Am = Cm(Θm). Therefore,
am,w = bm,w for all m and w. Hence the fixed point has the property that A = B, and they
are not only a prematching but a matching as well since a man prematching that is also
woman prematching is a matching.
Finally, we prove that the set of fixed points of C is the set of stable matchings. More
precisely, (A, A) is a fixed point of C if and only if A is a stable matching.
Suppose that a fixed point (A, A) of C is not stable. By construction of Cm and Cw,
A is individually rational. Then there is a blocking pair (m, w). By definition of blocking
pairs, there exist m′ ∈ M ∪ {m0} and w′ ∈ W ∪ {wo} such that mPwm′, wPmw′, am,w′ > 0,
and am′ ,w > 0. Now, the number of type-w women who are willing to match with m at A is
θm,w = Kw − ∑
i:mi Pwm
ai,w ≥ am,w + am′ ,w > am,w,
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as am′ ,w > 0. However, θm,w > am,w and am = Cm(Θm) contradicts that there is w′ with
wPmw′ and am,w′ > 0.
Suppose that A is a stable matching. We fix m and show that am = Cm(Θm) where
θm,w = Kw − ∑i:mi Pwm ai,w. Suppose, for contradiction, that am 6= Cm(Θm). Denote wj as
the most preferred type of women (with respect to Rm) such that am,j 6= (Cm(Θm))j. For all
wj′ preferred to wj, am,j′ = (Cm(Θm))j′ . Thus, am,j > (Cm(Θm))j implies either am,j > θm,j
or ∑j′ :wj′Rmwj am,j′ > Km, neither of which is possible. On the other hand, am,j < (Cm(Θm))j
contradicts that A is stable. Although there are type wj women available more than am,j,
some type m men are matched to less preferred women. Then, there is j′ such that wjPmwj′
and am,j′ > 0, so (m, wj) is a blocking pair. Similarly, we can show that aw = Cw(Θw),
and therefore (A, A) = C(A, A).
Proposition A2. Suppose that X and Y are stable matchings, then X ≤M Y if and only if
Y ≤W X.
Proof. Suppose that X and Y are stable matchings such that X ≤M Y, we show that
Y ≤W X. The other direction of the claim can be proved analogously.
Consider the construction of C in the proof of Proposition A1: Let Ψ and Ψ′ correspond
to the matrices for X and Y as in the proof. Since X and Y are stable matchings we have
C(X, X) = (X, X) and C(Y, Y) = (Y, Y). Since X ≤m Y for all m, Ψ′m,w ≤ Ψm,w for all m and
w. Therefore, Yw = Cw(Ψ′w) ≤w Cw(Ψw) = Xw for all w, which implies that Y ≤W X.
Proposition A3. Suppose that X and Y are two stable matchings. Then for any men or women
type a, either Xa ≤a Ya or Ya ≤a Xa. Consequently, Xa ∨a Ya = max≤a{Xa, Ya} and Xa ∧a Ya =
min≤a{Xa, Ya}.
Proof. We only prove the first part that either Xa ≤a Ya or Ya ≤a Xa, in three steps
depending on whether X and Y have integer, rational, and real entries. The second part
follows immediately from the first part.
Case 1 (Integer Entries): We first start with the case when X and Y have integer entries
as well as Kw and Km. From 〈M, W, P, K〉, we create a many-to-one matching market (of
colleges and students) as follows.
The set of types of men remains the same; interpreted as the set of colleges. A college
m has a capacity of Km. Whereas, each type-w woman is split into Kw copies, all of which
have the same preferences Pw over colleges; women types are interpreted as students. On
the other hand, m’s preferences P′m replace w in Pm with her copies enumerated from 1




m wkj if and only if k > l.
In addition, each college has responsive preferences over groups of students. The new
matching market with |M| colleges and ∑w Kw students is a many-to-one matching markets
where an outcome for a college is a group of students, and an outcome for a student is
either a college or being single.
Now, we construct a new matching, X′, in the new market from X. (The new matching
is a many-to-one matching, which is not an aggregate matching. Nevertheless, we use the
aggregate matching notation to stress the relations between X′ and X, and Y′ and Y.) It
is enough to describe the matches of students in X′. Rank woman w’s outcomes in X in
decreasing order according to her preference Pw. Let the lth copy of wj, wlj, match to the l
th
highest outcome of wj in X. Similarly, construct Y′ from Y.
We claim that X′ and Y′ are stable matchings in the new market. Suppose for contra-
diction that X′ is not a stable matching. Since X′ is individually rational by construction,
there exists a blocking pair (m, wlj). This means that w
l
j’s match is worse than m. Similarly,
m’s match includes a student worse than wlj: this agent cannot be w
k
j where k < l by
definition of P′m, and it cannot be wkj where k > l because by construction w
k
j ’s match is
worse than wlj’s match with respect to ¶wj. Hence, one of m’s matches is worse than w
l
j,
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and not a copy of wj. This means that (m, wj) forms a blocking pair in X: A contradiction
to the stability of X. Therefore, X′ must be stable. Similarly, Y′ is also stable.
Now, by Theorem 5.26 of [12], for any college m the outcomes in X′ and Y′ are
comparable. This means that the responsive preferences over groups of students inherited
from P′m, which is equivalent to the first-order stochastic dominance, can compare the
outcomes of m in these two stable matchings. Therefore, ≤m can compare the outcomes in
X and Y since Pm is a coarser order than P′m.
An analogous argument shows that ≤w can compare the matching outcomes in X
and Y.
Case 2 (Rational Entries): Suppose for now that all entries of X and Y are rational
numbers as well as Kw and Km. Define a new matching market from 〈M, W, P, K〉 as follows.
M, W, and P are the same. We change the capacities as follows. Find a common
factor of denominators in all entries in X and Y, say r, and multiply all capacities by r.
Therefore, the new market is 〈M, W, P, rK〉. Define X′ = rX and Y′ = rY with non-negative
integer entries. By the argument above, for any agent a, the matchings in rX and rY can
be compared with respect to ≤a which implies that the outcomes in X and Y can also
be compared.
Case 3 (Real Entries): Suppose now that entries of X and Y are real numbers. We
construct two sequences of matrices, X(n) and Y(n), as follows:
1. X(n) and Y(n) have rational entries,
2. x(n)ij = 0 ⇐⇒ xij = 0 and y
(n)
ij = 0 ⇐⇒ yij = 0 for all i, j,
3. the sum of entries in row i and column j is the same for X(n) and Y(n), and
4. x(n)ij → xij and y
(n)
ij → yij as n→ ∞ for all i, j.
By construction, stability of X and Y imply stability of X(n) and Y(n) for the same
market with adjusted capacities. By the argument above, for each type a, x(n)a and y
(n)
a can
be compared with respect to ≤a. Take a subsequence {nl} such that the ordering is the
same for all entries. Therefore, x(nl)a ≤a y(nl)a for all l or y(nl)a ≤a x(nl)a for all l. By taking l to
∞ we get that either xa ≤a ya in the former case, or ya ≤a xa in the latter since (4) implies
x(n)·,j → x·,j and y
(n)
i,· → yi,· as n→ ∞ for all i, j.
We have shown that (S(M, W, P, K),≤M) is a lattice in Proposition A1. Using the
proposition above, we show that the lattice, (S(M, W, P, K),≤M), is distributive.
Proposition A4. (S(M, W, P, K),≤M) is a distributive lattice.
Proof. Suppose that X, Y, and Z are stable matchings. We are going to prove that type a
has the same matching in X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) and (X ∧Y) ∨ (X ∧ Z) for all agent types a:
(X ∧ (Y ∨ Z))a = min{Xa, max{Ya, Za}}
= max{min{Xa, Ya}, min{Xa, Za}}
= max{(X ∧Y)a, (X ∧ Z)a}
= ((X ∧Y) ∨ (X ∧ Z))a,
where min and max operators are defined with respect to ≤a and where we repeatedly use
Proposition A3.
The proof that X ∨ (Y ∧ Z) = (X ∨Y) ∧ (X ∨ Z) is analogous.









yij for all j.
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Proof. The proof has the same structure as in the proof of Proposition A3: it has three steps
depending on whether X and Y have integer, rational, and real entries.
Case 1 (Integer Entries): We first start with the case when X and Y have integer entries
as well as Km for all m and Kw for all w. From 〈M, W, P, K〉, we create a many-to-one
matching market and also stable matchings X′ and Y′ in this new market as in the proof of
Proposition A3.









yij for all j.
Case 2 (Rational Entries): Suppose for now that all entries of X and Y are rational
numbers as well as Ka for all a. Define a new matching market from 〈M, W, P, K〉 as follows.
M, W, and P are the same. We change the capacities as follows. Find a common
factor of denominators in all entries in X and Y, say r, and multiply all capacities by r.
Therefore, the new market is 〈M, W, P, rK〉. Define X′ = rX and Y′ = rY with non-negative
integer entries.









for all j. The conclusion follows.
Case 3 (Real Entries): Suppose now that entries of X and Y are real numbers. We
construct two sequences of matrices, X(n) and Y(n), as follows:
1. X(n) and Y(n) have rational entries,
2. x(n)ij = 0 ⇐⇒ xij = 0 and y
(n)
ij = 0 ⇐⇒ yij = 0 for all i, j,
3. the sum of entries in row i and column j is the same for X(n) and Y(n), and
4. x(n)ij → xij and y
(n)
ij → yij as n→ ∞ for all i, j.
By construction, stability of X and Y imply stability of X(n) and Y(n)for the same









y(n)ij . If we take the limit of these equalities as n→ ∞, we get the
desired equalities.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let X be a rationalizable integral complete matching. Suppose that all cycles of the
associated graph (V, L) are balanced. Direct the edges of (V, L) such that each cycle is
oriented as follows: if 〈v0, . . . , vN〉 is a cycle, then the edge (vn, vn+1) ∈ L is oriented such
that d(vn+1, vn) = 1, which we denote by vn → vn+1. For each path 〈v0, . . . , vN〉, direct
the edges in a similar way. If the matching X is rationalizable, then such an orientation
of the edges exists and defines a rationalizing preference profile P (Theorem 2, Part 1).
The rationalizing preferences have the property that if xi,j = 0 and xi′ ,j′ > 0 then wj′¶miwj
if i = i′, and mi′¶wjmi if j = j′.
First, if X has no cycles, then it is rationalizable as the unique stable matching
(Theorem 2, Part 2), so there is nothing to prove, as a unique stable matching is also
the median stable matching. Suppose then that X has at least one cycle c = 〈v0, . . . , vN〉.
Enumerate the vertexes of the cycle such that vn → vn+1 in the orientation (directed graph)
of (V, L) above, and v0 lies in the same row as v1. Let
Θ = min v0, v2, . . . , vN−2 = min v1, v3, . . . , vN−1.
Let ε be the set of all |M| × |W|matrices E of integer numbers such that
• ei,j = 0 if (i, j) is not in the cycle c;
• for all i and j, ∑h ei,h = 0 and ∑l el,j = 0; and
• |ei,j| ≤ Θ.
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We want to make two observations about the matrices in ε. First, (X + E)i,j > 0 ⇒
xi,j > 0, so X + E is a stable matching for all E ∈ ε. Second, E ∈ ε if and only if −E ∈ ε; and
E ∈ ε is such that Xi ≤mi (X + E)i if and only if (X − E)i ≤mi Xi. Similarly, E ∈ ε is such
that Xj ≤wj (X + E)j if and only if (X− E)j ≤wj Xj.
We need to prove that any stable matching Y 6= X in the resulting market 〈M, W, P, K〉
must be obtained from X through matrices in ε: Then X is a median stable matching.
First, we prove that yi,j 6= xi,j only if xi,j is a vertex in a minimal cycle of X. The
number of single agents of each type is the same in X as in Y (Proposition A5; in this case
it is zero, as X has no single agents). So, if xi,j < yi,j then there is h 6= j and l 6= i such
that yi,h < xi,h and yl,j < xl,j. Similarly, if xi,j > yi,j then there is h 6= j and l 6= i such that
yi,h < xi,h and yl,j < xl,j. Hence, we can apply this observation repeatedly, starting from
any (i, j) with xi,j 6= yi,j and obtain a sequence (i1, j1), . . . , (iN , jN) with (i1, j1) = (iN , jN)
such that for each n ( mod N):
1. (xin ,jn − yin ,jn)(xin+1,jn+1 − yin+1,jn+1) < 0
2. in 6= in+1 ⇐⇒ jn = jn+1.
Claim 2. For n = 1, . . . , N, xin ,jn > 0.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that 0 = xi1,j1 < yi1,j1 . Without loss of generality, assume
that i1 = i2. By definition of the rationalization P, we have that wj2 Pmi1 wj1 , as xi1,j1 = 0 and
xi1,j2 > yi1,j2 ≥ 0. We can now show that if (in, jn) and (in+1, jn+1) differ in i, then jn prefers
min+1 to min ; and that if they differ in j, then in prefers wjn+1 to wjn . This fact, which we
prove in the next paragraph, establishes the contradiction: iN 6= iN−1, but miN−1 PwiN miN
by definition of P and because 0 = xiN ,jN = xi1,j1 .
To prove the fact, we reason by induction. We have already established that wj2 Pmi1 wj1 .
Suppose that wjn Pmin wjn−1 . By Property 1 of the sequence 〈(in, jn)
N
n=1〉, either xin−1,jn−1 > 0
and xin+1,jn+1 > 0; or yin−1,jn−1 > 0 and yin+1,jn+1 > 0 (or both hold). Then the stability of X
and Y implies that min+1 Pwjn min . The proof for the case when win Pwin min−1 is similar.
The claim implies that the sequence 〈vn = 〈xin ,jn〉 is a cycle in (V, L). Thus a stable
matching Y can only differ from X in vertexes that are part of a cycle of (V, L).
Second, we prove that E ≡ Y− X ∈ ε. We established above that ei,j 6= 0 only if xi,j is
a vertex in a cycle. We now prove that |ei,j| ≤ Θ. Clearly, ei,j ≥ −xi,j ≥ −Θ. We show that
if ei,j > 0 then there is h such that ei,j + ei,h = 0.
If ei,j > −ei,h for all h 6= i then there is h1 and h2 such that some type-mi men of
type mi who are married to women of type h1 and h2 in X are married to women of
type wj in Y. Then we can define two cycles, and xi,j would be a vertex in both of them.
The first cycle has (xi,j, xi,h1) as the first edge, and the remaining edges defined inductively,
by the definition of 〈(in, jn)〉 above. The second cycle has (xi,j, xi,h2) as the first edge,
and the remaining edges defined inductively. The resulting two cycles would be connected,
which contradicts the hypothesis that X is rationalizable. So there must exist some h with
ei,j ≤ −ei,h. An analogous argument applied to ei,h implies that ei,j ≥ −ei,h; so ei,j = −ei,h.
Then, ei,j ≤ Θ, as ei,h ≥ −Θ.
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